MDA Update
The Current State of U.S. Missile Defenses
Today we are confronted by an evolving ballistic missile threat posed by rogue states. Our intelligence agencies warn that in coming years we will face threats from short-, medium- and long-range ballistic missiles from a variety of actors. This threat is becoming more sophisticated as several countries work to develop more advanced and lethal missiles with longer ranges, and more pervasive, as global access to missile technologies grows.
North Korea has hundreds of deployable short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, and is developing a new intermediate-range ballistic missile and a new short-range, solidpropellant ballistic missile, test-launched in June 2007. With its several hundred shortand medium-range ballistic missiles, Iran has the largest force of ballistic missiles in the Middle East. In July 2008, Iran flight tested its Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile, capable of hitting Israel and U.S. bases in the region.
Let us assume for a moment that a country such as North Korea or Iran produces or acquires a nuclear warhead that it could place atop a long-range ballistic missile. Such a capability would give government leaders hostile to U.S. interests and policies a capability to hold our cities, and the cities of our allies, hostage, which would place unacceptable restrictions placed on how our leaders might respond in a crisis, that is unless we have defenses against that threat. Since June 2004, we have been fielding missile defense capabilities at an unprecedented pace to protect the United States, our troops deployed abroad, and our allies and friends. Today, we have a fielded system that provides a limited capability for defending the homeland against North Korean and Iranian long-range ballistic missiles, and we have a program in place to expand system capabilities over time to meet warfighter needs and future threat uncertainties.
Since President Bush directed the fielding of missile defenses early in his administration, our strategy also has been one of expanding coverage to our allies and friends. As missile defense capabilities expand worldwide, international cooperation with allies and friends is dramatically increasing.
Given Iran’s aggressive ballistic missile acquisition programs, and its desire to field missiles that will far overfly Israel and U.S. bases in the Middle East, there is currently an effort to introduce ground-based midcourse interceptors similar to what we have deployed in Alaska and California into Central Europe to protect European allies against long-range threats. Today, we have reached agreement with the Czech Republic to locate a fixed-site radar on Czech territory to improve our ability to track ballistic missiles and weaponized payloads launched from Iran. We are still in discussions with Poland to begin site construction for ten long-range interceptors. If approved by the U.S. Congress and by legislative bodies in the Czech Republic and Poland, construction on both sites could begin in 2009 and could begin functioning in 2011-2013.
Most of the missile defense interceptors we are fielding do not use explosives, but rather rely on body-to-body collisions in space or the atmosphere to destroy an incoming warhead at a closing speed of 15,000 miles per hour. Our tests involving hit-to-kill intercepts have shown convincingly that we can, despite the protestations of critics just a few short years ago, “hit a bullet with a bullet.”
Missile defense is one of the most challenging precision strike missions we face in the Department of Defense. Notionally, we are attempting to bring down a target missile capable of striking a target launched from several thousand kilometers away. Using a combination of sensors to detect and track the target, we are able to pass information into a battle management center so that the system can generate a weapons task plan and then launch the interceptor. Within minutes we are able to collide with the warhead in space within inches of the “sweetspot” we are aiming at. From 2001 through the June 2008 test of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, we have successfully demonstrated hit-to-kill with our Patriot PAC-3, sea-based Aegis BMD, THAAD, and Ground-based Midcourse Defense systems 35 of 43 times against short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic missiles.
Multiple defensive layers, with system elements working together synergistically, are critical to successful missile defense. Several capabilities can provide a defense in depth, across all flight segments of a threat missile—boost, midcourse and terminal. There are several development programs currently funded through 2013 to field new ground-based, sea-based and airborne weapons as well as space-based and mobile discrimination sensors that would give the layered defense system new capabilities for engaging all ranges of ballistic missiles.
Next to a boost phase defense (which faces very challenging timelines), terrestrialbased weapons that engage in space, in the middle or midcourse of a missile’s or warhead’s flight, offer the greatest flexibility in terms of addressing different possible flight azimuths, trajectories and launch points and can defend a very large area. Terminal defenses, like THAAD and the Patriot PAC-3 systems, defend a much smaller area. It is important to ensure that midcourse defenses against all ranges of missiles are increasingly capable of handling midcourse countermeasures and multiple objects. Our work on two boost phase systems, airborne laser and the kinetic energy interceptor, is intended to provide an initial boost phase capability, to hit the target early in its flight, while our work on the multiple kill vehicle program would give us a capability to use a single interceptor to kill several objects in a threat cluster.
Space seems to have the most to offer if we are striving for global and timely protection. Successful development and deployment of space-based space surveillance and tracking system of satellites would enable a global on-call missile defense capability and a timely response to rapidly evolving threats, even threats emanating from unpredicted locations.
Our missile defense capabilities have already played stabilizing roles on the international scene. We were able to activate the system in July 2006 in response to suspicious North Korean missile activities, which eventually led to the launch of a long-range missile capable of reaching U.S. territory. That launch failed, but the activation of the system helped stabilize a crisis situation by providing an option to our civilian and military leaders other than a highly provocative preemptive attack on the launch site.
In February 2008 the Department of Defense used its shorter-range sea-based missile defenses to destroy a large tank of toxic fuel onboard an out-of-control U.S. satellite. Officials in the U.S. government did not know when and where the satellite would reenter, and it had become fairly certain the fuel tank would survive reentry and possibly break up on Earth, which could have posed a severe health risk to anyone who might have been exposed to the toxic substance.
With missile defense, we do not need to rely on deterrence, which can fail, or retaliation, which is an after-the-fact response, to enhance the security of the American people or our allies after the damage has been done. Importantly, missile defense can give our civilian and uniformed leaders another valuable option in a crisis. The ability to protect against threats of coercion and actively defend ourselves against ballistic missiles is essential to our future safety. ♦
North Korea has hundreds of deployable short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, and is developing a new intermediate-range ballistic missile and a new short-range, solidpropellant ballistic missile, test-launched in June 2007. With its several hundred shortand medium-range ballistic missiles, Iran has the largest force of ballistic missiles in the Middle East. In July 2008, Iran flight tested its Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile, capable of hitting Israel and U.S. bases in the region.
Let us assume for a moment that a country such as North Korea or Iran produces or acquires a nuclear warhead that it could place atop a long-range ballistic missile. Such a capability would give government leaders hostile to U.S. interests and policies a capability to hold our cities, and the cities of our allies, hostage, which would place unacceptable restrictions placed on how our leaders might respond in a crisis, that is unless we have defenses against that threat. Since June 2004, we have been fielding missile defense capabilities at an unprecedented pace to protect the United States, our troops deployed abroad, and our allies and friends. Today, we have a fielded system that provides a limited capability for defending the homeland against North Korean and Iranian long-range ballistic missiles, and we have a program in place to expand system capabilities over time to meet warfighter needs and future threat uncertainties.
Since President Bush directed the fielding of missile defenses early in his administration, our strategy also has been one of expanding coverage to our allies and friends. As missile defense capabilities expand worldwide, international cooperation with allies and friends is dramatically increasing.
Given Iran’s aggressive ballistic missile acquisition programs, and its desire to field missiles that will far overfly Israel and U.S. bases in the Middle East, there is currently an effort to introduce ground-based midcourse interceptors similar to what we have deployed in Alaska and California into Central Europe to protect European allies against long-range threats. Today, we have reached agreement with the Czech Republic to locate a fixed-site radar on Czech territory to improve our ability to track ballistic missiles and weaponized payloads launched from Iran. We are still in discussions with Poland to begin site construction for ten long-range interceptors. If approved by the U.S. Congress and by legislative bodies in the Czech Republic and Poland, construction on both sites could begin in 2009 and could begin functioning in 2011-2013.
Most of the missile defense interceptors we are fielding do not use explosives, but rather rely on body-to-body collisions in space or the atmosphere to destroy an incoming warhead at a closing speed of 15,000 miles per hour. Our tests involving hit-to-kill intercepts have shown convincingly that we can, despite the protestations of critics just a few short years ago, “hit a bullet with a bullet.”
Missile defense is one of the most challenging precision strike missions we face in the Department of Defense. Notionally, we are attempting to bring down a target missile capable of striking a target launched from several thousand kilometers away. Using a combination of sensors to detect and track the target, we are able to pass information into a battle management center so that the system can generate a weapons task plan and then launch the interceptor. Within minutes we are able to collide with the warhead in space within inches of the “sweetspot” we are aiming at. From 2001 through the June 2008 test of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, we have successfully demonstrated hit-to-kill with our Patriot PAC-3, sea-based Aegis BMD, THAAD, and Ground-based Midcourse Defense systems 35 of 43 times against short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic missiles.
Multiple defensive layers, with system elements working together synergistically, are critical to successful missile defense. Several capabilities can provide a defense in depth, across all flight segments of a threat missile—boost, midcourse and terminal. There are several development programs currently funded through 2013 to field new ground-based, sea-based and airborne weapons as well as space-based and mobile discrimination sensors that would give the layered defense system new capabilities for engaging all ranges of ballistic missiles.
Next to a boost phase defense (which faces very challenging timelines), terrestrialbased weapons that engage in space, in the middle or midcourse of a missile’s or warhead’s flight, offer the greatest flexibility in terms of addressing different possible flight azimuths, trajectories and launch points and can defend a very large area. Terminal defenses, like THAAD and the Patriot PAC-3 systems, defend a much smaller area. It is important to ensure that midcourse defenses against all ranges of missiles are increasingly capable of handling midcourse countermeasures and multiple objects. Our work on two boost phase systems, airborne laser and the kinetic energy interceptor, is intended to provide an initial boost phase capability, to hit the target early in its flight, while our work on the multiple kill vehicle program would give us a capability to use a single interceptor to kill several objects in a threat cluster.
Space seems to have the most to offer if we are striving for global and timely protection. Successful development and deployment of space-based space surveillance and tracking system of satellites would enable a global on-call missile defense capability and a timely response to rapidly evolving threats, even threats emanating from unpredicted locations.
Our missile defense capabilities have already played stabilizing roles on the international scene. We were able to activate the system in July 2006 in response to suspicious North Korean missile activities, which eventually led to the launch of a long-range missile capable of reaching U.S. territory. That launch failed, but the activation of the system helped stabilize a crisis situation by providing an option to our civilian and military leaders other than a highly provocative preemptive attack on the launch site.
In February 2008 the Department of Defense used its shorter-range sea-based missile defenses to destroy a large tank of toxic fuel onboard an out-of-control U.S. satellite. Officials in the U.S. government did not know when and where the satellite would reenter, and it had become fairly certain the fuel tank would survive reentry and possibly break up on Earth, which could have posed a severe health risk to anyone who might have been exposed to the toxic substance.
With missile defense, we do not need to rely on deterrence, which can fail, or retaliation, which is an after-the-fact response, to enhance the security of the American people or our allies after the damage has been done. Importantly, missile defense can give our civilian and uniformed leaders another valuable option in a crisis. The ability to protect against threats of coercion and actively defend ourselves against ballistic missiles is essential to our future safety. ♦