View from the Hill
Making the Case for 21st Century Missile Defense
by Senator Jon Kyle
Twenty-five years ago, President Reagan announced his vision to move beyond a world where America’s security rested on the threat of mutually assured destruction. His historic Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) speech marked the dawn of a new era in which the United States began to view missile defense as a key component of the national strategy against weapons of mass destruction.
The Department of Defense has since overcome many political and technological hurdles in developing and deploying ballistic missile defense capabilities to protect the U.S., its allies and deployed forces. But the U.S. now faces more complex and less clearly understood threats than it did 25 years ago, and our systems have only a limited capability to defend against a small number of missiles and only in the midcourse and terminal phases of flight. Boost phase capabilities are still in the initial development stages and are years away from fielding.
Even if some of the current developmental projects pan out in several years time, they will not be capable of providing a global, persistent ballistic missile defense. The biggest deficiency lies in the lack of space-based capabilities. It is now time to expand our space capabilities beyond situation awareness to space protection from ballistic missile and space threats, anytime and anywhere.
TWO CRITICAL NATIONAL SECURITY VULNERABILITIES
Ballistic Missile Threat
The ballistic missile threat is undeniable. Today, at least 27 nations have ballistic missile capability, and the knowledge to build and use ballistic missiles is rapidly proliferating, especially among nations unfriendly to American interests. Last year alone, there were more than 120 ballistic missile launches. Despite the number of nations proliferating ballistic missile technologies, current missile defense policy acknowledges only rogue regimes, such as North Korea and Iran, as the primary ballistic missile threats to the U.S.
The threat, however, is not limited to North Korea and Iran. Russia, ever the bully and increasingly uncooperative in global affairs (especially when it comes to Iran), continues development and proliferation of new missile technology and remains the sole nation with the ability to incinerate the United States. Its ballistic missile modernization efforts were highlighted last year in a series of highly publicized missile launches, including the new multiple-warhead intercontinental missile, the RS-24, designed specifically to evade U.S. missile defense systems.
China’s continued military modernization, and continued proliferation of ballistic missile technology raises concerns about both its capabilities and its limitations. The 2008 Annual Report of Military Power of the People’s Republic of China noted the problems the People’s Liberation Army has had communicating with its submarines at sea and the inexperience of its Navy in performing strategic patrols. What’s more, the land-based strategic missile forces face “scenarios in which missile batteries lose communication links with higher echelons and other situations that would require commanders to choose alternative launch locations.” These findings raise serious questions about potential accidental or unauthorized launches from a nation with a growing arsenal of ballistic missiles and an ambitious program to modernize its nuclear weapons.
The increase of both the technological sophistication of ballistic missile capability and the number of countries that possess these weapons makes it more important than ever that the U.S. develop the means to counter this threat. But we cannot afford to ignore a new threat to our national security posed by ballistic missiles.
Space Threat
The proliferation and development of ballistic missiles threatens more than just the homeland, our deployed forces overseas or our allies. The U.S. has become virtually dependent on space-based systems. Attacks against our satellites in space would adversely affect not only military operations, but also financial networks, GPS navigation, manufacturing inventory control, weather tracking, the emergency response system, the Internet backbone and much more. The days of considering space a sanctuary are long gone.
The 2007 Chinese ASAT test made clear that China intends to hold at risk the satellites of its potential adversaries, namely the United States. Chinese academics and military strategists have confirmed that the Chinese have been working since Operation Desert Storm to overcome the conventional military superiority of the United States. Wang Hucheng, an analyst for the People’s Liberation Army, has called our space systems the “soft ribs” of the U.S. military, and has observed, “for countries that can never win a war with the United States by using the method of tanks and planes, attacking the U.S. space system may be an irresistible and most tempting choice.”
The Chinese are not resting on the laurels of their January 2007 demonstration, as evidenced by reports that the Chinese are even planning to put ASAT interceptors on submarines. These reports have been worrying the Pentagon because submarines can launch from anywhere, at any time, with next to no warning. In addition to developing anti-satellite systems, China is attempting to establish a serious foothold in space, reportedly planning, for example to launch 15 rockets and 18 satellites this year.
Despite 25 years of stop-and-go progress, the U.S. is years away from having a global, persistent missile defense system capable of engaging all known ballistic missile threats, including direct ascent ASATs.
WHY ARE WE NOT MORE PROTECTED FROM THESE THREATS?
Insufficient Funding for Missile Defense
President Reagan envisioned a more moral world in which missile defense, rather than massive retaliation, would protect the U.S. Yet, if the budget for missile defense is any indication, it appears we are on the verge of stopping what President Reagan started. Current Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) midcourse and terminal phase capabilities are only able to engage a limited number and type of missiles. Yet, during the fiscal year 2008 congressional authorization and appropriations process, missile defense suffered about $450 million in cuts by Congress. These cuts were on top of the $500 million reduction from fiscal year 2007 levels in the president’s budget for fiscal year 2008. The fiscal year 2009 missile defense budget request by the president represents a virtual flatline of funding, and like last year, some critical programs are on the chopping block: the House Armed Services Committee has cut over $700 million and the Senate Armed Services Committee cut over $400 million from the president’s fiscal year 2009 request for missile defense.
Not satisfied with cuts to the top line of the missile defense budget, Democrats in both the House and the Senate continue to strip funding for developmental programs intended to provide defenses against the so-called farterm threats in favor of near-term threats. Prioritizing national security objectives is Congress’ responsibility through its power of the purse, but by not funding far-term threats, the United States will find itself unprepared to counter security challenges in the years ahead. This was the finding of the 1998 Rumsfeld Commission on Missile Defense, which concluded: “No. 1, the missile threat to the United States is real and growing; No. 2, the threat is greater than previously assessed; and, No. 3, we may have little or no warning of new threats.” Simply put, it takes time to recognize a threat, analyze it and develop it, and deploy an effective counter.
Congressional opponents of missile defense have never been consistent in their arguments. They have generally maintained a “research forever, deploy never” attitude. They argue other programs are higher priority—the Peace Corps for example. Others just say silly things like, “I don’t agree with a missile defense system.” They should be held accountable for the spectacularly dangerous implications of such statements. But it all suggests a larger problem: despite clear evidence to the contrary, many politicians refuse to see a ballistic missile threat.
BELIEF THERE IS NO NEED FOR SPACE-BASED LAYER OF MISSILE DEFENSE
In addition to the cuts in fiscal year 2008 baseline missile defense funding, space programs were also cut by Congress by about a half billion dollars from the president’s request. Congress obviously did not take the Chinese ASAT test seriously and saw no urgency to develop and deploy necessary spaced-based capabilities. Specifically, Congress has not even been able to provide a mere $10 million out of a more than half a trillion dollar defense budget to fund the Space Test Bed study! Many in Congress do not even believe that space is a contested domain. For example, the Senate Armed Services Committee report stated both last year and this year that, “There is no threat that justifies such a deployment [referring to space-based interceptors], and therefore no justification to create such a test-bed.” This stubborn opposition, in the face of irrefutable evidence (albeit, much of which is classified), is very dangerous.
The evidence of the ASAT threat is not new and January 2007 was not the first time policymakers were warned about it. In fact, the 2001 Rumsfeld Commission on National Security Space issued what was among the first reports to warn of the so-called “Space Pearl Harbor.” The report concluded, “it is in the U.S. national interest to ‘develop and deploy the means to deter and defend against hostile acts directed at U.S. space assets and against the uses of space hostile to U.S. interests.’” Moreover, since the U.S. is now highly reliant on space-based capabilities, there is, as noted, an inherent vulnerability to ballistic missile and other kinds of attacks.
UNWARRANTED FEAR OF SPACE ARMS RACE
In addition to stating there is no threat warranting a Space Test Bed study, these same critics wrongfully assert another argument— that any funding would be used to haphazardly deploy interceptors in space, thus “militarizing space.” There has not been a serious debate on the feasibility of and options for a space-based interceptor since Congress and the Clinton Administration ended funding for the Brilliant Pebbles program in 1993. In the absence of a rational debate, Congress prefers to disregard the potential of a space-based missile defense layer as an effective means to defend against both the ballistic missile threat and the space threat. Opponents in Congress continue to talk scarily of space weaponization, as if space wasn’t already weaponized, and assert that the U.S. needs to pursue a space weapons ban treaty.
The U.S should never rest its national security and economic prosperity on pieces of paper, especially when those pieces of paper make promises that are completely unenforceable, as is the case with a space weapons ban treaty. Ambassador Donald A. Mahley, Acting deputy assistant secretary for Threat Reduction, Export Controls noted, “The inherent nature of space systems, including the definition challenges and concealable breakout potential simply denies effective verification in any negotiation.” For example, it would be impossible to detect and monitor a secondary ASAT payload contained in an orbiting satellite.
State Department Assistant Secretary for Verification, Compliance and Implementation Paula DeSutter noted the relative ease of concealment of outlawed activities under such a treaty. Implementation of a space weapons ban treaty, she notes, would be little more than “feel good arms control” that would constrain “our ability to seek real remedies to the vulnerabilities that we face” with the “net effect of harming rather than enhancing U.S. and international security and well-being.” For example, it would be in China’s national security interest to cheat on a space weapons ban treaty, as space is a strategic necessity to deal with overwhelming U.S. conventional superiority. If China were to adhere to a space weapons ban treaty, it would give up the ability to deafen, blind and mute U.S. space-based capabilities. A space weapons ban is meaningless if it doesn’t deal with the means to defeat space systems. That is why Chinese and Russian diplomats and scholars have noted any space weapons ban would require limiting U.S. missile defenses. The false belief that there is no threat to U.S. assets in space and the fear of a space arms race are the reasons Congress has not taken the necessary corrective action to debate and study a space-based missile defense layer.
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE
The only way to ensure full funding for a global, persistent missile defense system is to have the necessary, long overdue policy debate on the feasibility of a space-based missile defense layer. Last year’s Chinese ASAT test showed the world how vulnerable space assets are, but the warnings have been coming for quite a few years. Will it be necessary to have a third Rumsfeld Commission convene only to again warn decision-makers that the enemy “will attack with little or no warning” before Congress seriously debates the most effective way to protect the U.S., its allies, and deployed forces from the ballistic missile and space threat? If Congress continues to wait, this third commission may take place in the aftermath of an otherwise avoidable attack and will rightfully blame policymakers’ willful blindness to known threats and defenses.
The spreading threat posed by ballistic missiles means that the U.S. must develop and deploy capabilities sooner to ensure a robust missile defense system and freedom of action in space. In the coming years, we must address the last true hurdle to our ability to protect our nation and our allies from the ballistic missile threat and begin in earnest to research and develop a space-based layer of defense. The present operational capabilities are ill-suited to respond to rapidly proliferating ballistic missile threats and to protect our national security space systems from the kind of direct-ascent attack the Chinese and Russians have so far demonstrated. President Reagan, in advocating the policy of “peace through strength” that became the hallmark of his administration, once observed, “of the four wars in my lifetime, none came about because the United States was too strong.” It is simply a historical fact that countries that have taken the requisite steps to defend themselves do not get attacked. Perpetuating a vulnerable and fragile national security space system is an inducement to attack. It is vital for the U.S. to be prepared to defend our nation from threats, whatever their source. ♦
The Department of Defense has since overcome many political and technological hurdles in developing and deploying ballistic missile defense capabilities to protect the U.S., its allies and deployed forces. But the U.S. now faces more complex and less clearly understood threats than it did 25 years ago, and our systems have only a limited capability to defend against a small number of missiles and only in the midcourse and terminal phases of flight. Boost phase capabilities are still in the initial development stages and are years away from fielding.
Even if some of the current developmental projects pan out in several years time, they will not be capable of providing a global, persistent ballistic missile defense. The biggest deficiency lies in the lack of space-based capabilities. It is now time to expand our space capabilities beyond situation awareness to space protection from ballistic missile and space threats, anytime and anywhere.
TWO CRITICAL NATIONAL SECURITY VULNERABILITIES
Ballistic Missile Threat
The ballistic missile threat is undeniable. Today, at least 27 nations have ballistic missile capability, and the knowledge to build and use ballistic missiles is rapidly proliferating, especially among nations unfriendly to American interests. Last year alone, there were more than 120 ballistic missile launches. Despite the number of nations proliferating ballistic missile technologies, current missile defense policy acknowledges only rogue regimes, such as North Korea and Iran, as the primary ballistic missile threats to the U.S.
The threat, however, is not limited to North Korea and Iran. Russia, ever the bully and increasingly uncooperative in global affairs (especially when it comes to Iran), continues development and proliferation of new missile technology and remains the sole nation with the ability to incinerate the United States. Its ballistic missile modernization efforts were highlighted last year in a series of highly publicized missile launches, including the new multiple-warhead intercontinental missile, the RS-24, designed specifically to evade U.S. missile defense systems.
China’s continued military modernization, and continued proliferation of ballistic missile technology raises concerns about both its capabilities and its limitations. The 2008 Annual Report of Military Power of the People’s Republic of China noted the problems the People’s Liberation Army has had communicating with its submarines at sea and the inexperience of its Navy in performing strategic patrols. What’s more, the land-based strategic missile forces face “scenarios in which missile batteries lose communication links with higher echelons and other situations that would require commanders to choose alternative launch locations.” These findings raise serious questions about potential accidental or unauthorized launches from a nation with a growing arsenal of ballistic missiles and an ambitious program to modernize its nuclear weapons.
The increase of both the technological sophistication of ballistic missile capability and the number of countries that possess these weapons makes it more important than ever that the U.S. develop the means to counter this threat. But we cannot afford to ignore a new threat to our national security posed by ballistic missiles.
Space Threat
The proliferation and development of ballistic missiles threatens more than just the homeland, our deployed forces overseas or our allies. The U.S. has become virtually dependent on space-based systems. Attacks against our satellites in space would adversely affect not only military operations, but also financial networks, GPS navigation, manufacturing inventory control, weather tracking, the emergency response system, the Internet backbone and much more. The days of considering space a sanctuary are long gone.
The 2007 Chinese ASAT test made clear that China intends to hold at risk the satellites of its potential adversaries, namely the United States. Chinese academics and military strategists have confirmed that the Chinese have been working since Operation Desert Storm to overcome the conventional military superiority of the United States. Wang Hucheng, an analyst for the People’s Liberation Army, has called our space systems the “soft ribs” of the U.S. military, and has observed, “for countries that can never win a war with the United States by using the method of tanks and planes, attacking the U.S. space system may be an irresistible and most tempting choice.”
The Chinese are not resting on the laurels of their January 2007 demonstration, as evidenced by reports that the Chinese are even planning to put ASAT interceptors on submarines. These reports have been worrying the Pentagon because submarines can launch from anywhere, at any time, with next to no warning. In addition to developing anti-satellite systems, China is attempting to establish a serious foothold in space, reportedly planning, for example to launch 15 rockets and 18 satellites this year.
Despite 25 years of stop-and-go progress, the U.S. is years away from having a global, persistent missile defense system capable of engaging all known ballistic missile threats, including direct ascent ASATs.
WHY ARE WE NOT MORE PROTECTED FROM THESE THREATS?
Insufficient Funding for Missile Defense
President Reagan envisioned a more moral world in which missile defense, rather than massive retaliation, would protect the U.S. Yet, if the budget for missile defense is any indication, it appears we are on the verge of stopping what President Reagan started. Current Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) midcourse and terminal phase capabilities are only able to engage a limited number and type of missiles. Yet, during the fiscal year 2008 congressional authorization and appropriations process, missile defense suffered about $450 million in cuts by Congress. These cuts were on top of the $500 million reduction from fiscal year 2007 levels in the president’s budget for fiscal year 2008. The fiscal year 2009 missile defense budget request by the president represents a virtual flatline of funding, and like last year, some critical programs are on the chopping block: the House Armed Services Committee has cut over $700 million and the Senate Armed Services Committee cut over $400 million from the president’s fiscal year 2009 request for missile defense.
Not satisfied with cuts to the top line of the missile defense budget, Democrats in both the House and the Senate continue to strip funding for developmental programs intended to provide defenses against the so-called farterm threats in favor of near-term threats. Prioritizing national security objectives is Congress’ responsibility through its power of the purse, but by not funding far-term threats, the United States will find itself unprepared to counter security challenges in the years ahead. This was the finding of the 1998 Rumsfeld Commission on Missile Defense, which concluded: “No. 1, the missile threat to the United States is real and growing; No. 2, the threat is greater than previously assessed; and, No. 3, we may have little or no warning of new threats.” Simply put, it takes time to recognize a threat, analyze it and develop it, and deploy an effective counter.
Congressional opponents of missile defense have never been consistent in their arguments. They have generally maintained a “research forever, deploy never” attitude. They argue other programs are higher priority—the Peace Corps for example. Others just say silly things like, “I don’t agree with a missile defense system.” They should be held accountable for the spectacularly dangerous implications of such statements. But it all suggests a larger problem: despite clear evidence to the contrary, many politicians refuse to see a ballistic missile threat.
BELIEF THERE IS NO NEED FOR SPACE-BASED LAYER OF MISSILE DEFENSE
In addition to the cuts in fiscal year 2008 baseline missile defense funding, space programs were also cut by Congress by about a half billion dollars from the president’s request. Congress obviously did not take the Chinese ASAT test seriously and saw no urgency to develop and deploy necessary spaced-based capabilities. Specifically, Congress has not even been able to provide a mere $10 million out of a more than half a trillion dollar defense budget to fund the Space Test Bed study! Many in Congress do not even believe that space is a contested domain. For example, the Senate Armed Services Committee report stated both last year and this year that, “There is no threat that justifies such a deployment [referring to space-based interceptors], and therefore no justification to create such a test-bed.” This stubborn opposition, in the face of irrefutable evidence (albeit, much of which is classified), is very dangerous.
The evidence of the ASAT threat is not new and January 2007 was not the first time policymakers were warned about it. In fact, the 2001 Rumsfeld Commission on National Security Space issued what was among the first reports to warn of the so-called “Space Pearl Harbor.” The report concluded, “it is in the U.S. national interest to ‘develop and deploy the means to deter and defend against hostile acts directed at U.S. space assets and against the uses of space hostile to U.S. interests.’” Moreover, since the U.S. is now highly reliant on space-based capabilities, there is, as noted, an inherent vulnerability to ballistic missile and other kinds of attacks.
UNWARRANTED FEAR OF SPACE ARMS RACE
In addition to stating there is no threat warranting a Space Test Bed study, these same critics wrongfully assert another argument— that any funding would be used to haphazardly deploy interceptors in space, thus “militarizing space.” There has not been a serious debate on the feasibility of and options for a space-based interceptor since Congress and the Clinton Administration ended funding for the Brilliant Pebbles program in 1993. In the absence of a rational debate, Congress prefers to disregard the potential of a space-based missile defense layer as an effective means to defend against both the ballistic missile threat and the space threat. Opponents in Congress continue to talk scarily of space weaponization, as if space wasn’t already weaponized, and assert that the U.S. needs to pursue a space weapons ban treaty.
The U.S should never rest its national security and economic prosperity on pieces of paper, especially when those pieces of paper make promises that are completely unenforceable, as is the case with a space weapons ban treaty. Ambassador Donald A. Mahley, Acting deputy assistant secretary for Threat Reduction, Export Controls noted, “The inherent nature of space systems, including the definition challenges and concealable breakout potential simply denies effective verification in any negotiation.” For example, it would be impossible to detect and monitor a secondary ASAT payload contained in an orbiting satellite.
State Department Assistant Secretary for Verification, Compliance and Implementation Paula DeSutter noted the relative ease of concealment of outlawed activities under such a treaty. Implementation of a space weapons ban treaty, she notes, would be little more than “feel good arms control” that would constrain “our ability to seek real remedies to the vulnerabilities that we face” with the “net effect of harming rather than enhancing U.S. and international security and well-being.” For example, it would be in China’s national security interest to cheat on a space weapons ban treaty, as space is a strategic necessity to deal with overwhelming U.S. conventional superiority. If China were to adhere to a space weapons ban treaty, it would give up the ability to deafen, blind and mute U.S. space-based capabilities. A space weapons ban is meaningless if it doesn’t deal with the means to defeat space systems. That is why Chinese and Russian diplomats and scholars have noted any space weapons ban would require limiting U.S. missile defenses. The false belief that there is no threat to U.S. assets in space and the fear of a space arms race are the reasons Congress has not taken the necessary corrective action to debate and study a space-based missile defense layer.
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE
The only way to ensure full funding for a global, persistent missile defense system is to have the necessary, long overdue policy debate on the feasibility of a space-based missile defense layer. Last year’s Chinese ASAT test showed the world how vulnerable space assets are, but the warnings have been coming for quite a few years. Will it be necessary to have a third Rumsfeld Commission convene only to again warn decision-makers that the enemy “will attack with little or no warning” before Congress seriously debates the most effective way to protect the U.S., its allies, and deployed forces from the ballistic missile and space threat? If Congress continues to wait, this third commission may take place in the aftermath of an otherwise avoidable attack and will rightfully blame policymakers’ willful blindness to known threats and defenses.
The spreading threat posed by ballistic missiles means that the U.S. must develop and deploy capabilities sooner to ensure a robust missile defense system and freedom of action in space. In the coming years, we must address the last true hurdle to our ability to protect our nation and our allies from the ballistic missile threat and begin in earnest to research and develop a space-based layer of defense. The present operational capabilities are ill-suited to respond to rapidly proliferating ballistic missile threats and to protect our national security space systems from the kind of direct-ascent attack the Chinese and Russians have so far demonstrated. President Reagan, in advocating the policy of “peace through strength” that became the hallmark of his administration, once observed, “of the four wars in my lifetime, none came about because the United States was too strong.” It is simply a historical fact that countries that have taken the requisite steps to defend themselves do not get attacked. Perpetuating a vulnerable and fragile national security space system is an inducement to attack. It is vital for the U.S. to be prepared to defend our nation from threats, whatever their source. ♦