Importance of Space to Warfighters
Written by Brigadier General Kurt S. Story, U.S. Army
Space is now so pervasive in almost every industry sector, enabling and enhancing our way of life, noted General James Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at a February 2009 address to the George Marshall Institute and the Space Enterprise Council. Because economic security and national security are increasingly intertwined, he argued for greater communications between the national security community, the intelligence community and the business community. Cartwright further observed that each community is currently stovepiped, which means that we as a nation are not prepared to handle a “day without space” scenario.
The same empowering use and dependence on space systems is a modern facet of military operations. Full spectrum military operations are dependent on the Global Positioning System (GPS); satellite communications, space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance products (ISR); early missile warning; and space-based weather and environmental monitoring.
Space-based capabilities have expanded the battlespace and now allow U.S. forces to dominate terrain like never before. For example, in the 1990s an armored cavalry regiment was responsible for the 365-kilometer front at the Fulda Gap—maybe 100 square miles. That battlespace was linear, contiguous and tied together by line-of-sight communications. Today in Iraq, a regiment is able to cover over 31,000 square miles consisting of non-linear, multiple operating areas using space-enabled communications integrated with line-of-sight systems.
Today’s headquarters in divisions are tied to space force enhancement systems, and they are enabling dominant land power in seven key areas: operational maneuver from strategic distances; concurrent and subsequent stability operations; intra-theater operational maneuver; network-enabled; shaping entry operations; distributed support and sustainment; decisive maneuver. The Army’s priorities for space—enhanced satellite communications; early missile warning; persistent surveillance; positioning, navigation and, timing; weather, terrain and environmental monitoring; and assured access and asset protection—support not only the equipment in use today, but looks to future requirements like those of the Future Combat System (FCS).
Tomorrow’s FCS is enabled by and reliant on space systems for mission success. This system of systems capability and the soldiers who operate it are tied together by LandWarNet, which is the Army’s portion of the Global Information Grid.
Under the LandWarNet umbrella, all FCS vehicles beyond line of sight will be connected by Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T), which has been developed to support a more mobile, expeditionary Army. Additionally, WIN-T provides more network robustness and throughput capacity than the legacy line-of-sight mobile subscriber equipment can. The new communications architecture was designed to move with the formations of FCS vehicles by allowing the user to switch between satellite communications, aerial relays and line-of- sight communications to best serve the communications needs and to stay in touch with the rest of the formation.
Overall, space-based capabilities— including GPS position and navigation and ISR satellites that will exfiltrate data from unattended ground sensors, which the Future Combat System depends on— are critical to the FCS’s fundamental operational maneuver principles: to see first, understand first, act first and finish decisively. In all, to be successful, this family of systems will be required to acquire, access and disseminate relevant and accurate information at requisite levels of detail over the operational area, regardless of how large.
This dependence creates vulnerabilities. The nation’s potential adversaries understand the tremendous advantage space-based assets provide the U.S. military and how dependent warfighters are on them. Militaries around the globe are constantly studying U.S. military operations to gain insight, and assessing U.S. military vulnerabilities and strengths while employing its on-orbit assets during military conflict. Adversaries hope to maximize their own space-based capabilities, develop methods to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities in space, and develop effective countermeasures to U.S. strengths.
Elements of our space architecture are potentially susceptible to various types of active threats. For example, ground stations can be engaged by conventional means, by electronic attack via computer systems and electromagnetic pulse—or EMP—weapons, or by a natural disaster. Satellites are vulnerable to anti-satellite systems such as low-altitude, direct ascent interceptors; low-altitude, co-orbital interceptors; high-altitude, shortduration interceptors; and long-duration orbital interceptors and directed energy weapons. And directed energy weapons can engage multiple targets unlike the one-shot, one-kill missile interceptors. Ground and air-based lasers can cause damage to satellite thermal control, electro- optics, structural, and power generation components on low-earth-orbit satellites. The signals themselves are also susceptible to interruption; for example, devices for sale on the open market claim to block GPS signals.
Several avenues offer mitigation of the risk and threats, and some assurance of access to space systems when we need it. Space situational awareness (SSA) is one avenue. According to Joint Publication 3-14, Joint Space Operations, SSA is fundamental to conducting space operations, is the foundation to accomplishing all other space tasks, and supports missions such as ensuring space operations and spaceflight safety, i.e., collision avoidance. SSA is a means of verifying implementation of international treaties and agreements. It supports the decision-making process in offensive and defensive space control mission areas and makes it possible for national leaders to make decisions in order to protect U.S. and friendly space capabilities and deter others from initiating attacks. Thus it protects U.S. military operations and national interests.
We can protect our assets against electronic warfare by adding protective features to satellites and ground stations, e.g., hardening them against electromagnetic pulses and high-powered microwaves, providing a means to protect the electronic transmissions through data stream manipulation. We can protect against those who would jam satellite transmissions by aggressively monitoring the interference so that the source can be located and neutralized.
An effective way of mitigating almost any risk is redundancy. U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command/ Army Forces Strategic Command (USASMDC/ARSTRAT) is involved in several initiatives to provide that redundancy. The command is working with the Department of Defense’s Operational Responsive Space Office to develop systems, mainly low-cost satellites that can be launched in hours and days to respond to emergent needs of the warfighter, reconstitute constellations as well as add to satellite assets already on orbit to augment capacity. To add to the low-cost satellite arsenal that can augment capacity, USASMDC/ARSTRAT’s technical center is developing a nanosatellite weighing less than four kilograms that will have the capability of providing over-the-horizon communications for the warfighter. The primary objective will be to receive data from multiple ground transmitters and relay that data to ground stations within the nano’s area of access. The secondary objective is to provide real-time voice and text message data relay to and from field-deployed tactical radios.
Redundancies that complement and augment space-based assets can be created by using systems that operate in either high altitude or air. For example, high altitude blimps and winged craft can provide communications, wide-area surveillance, tactically persistent surveillance, and missile warning to name a few. FCS’s unmanned aircraft system operating in the “air” domain can also supply those functionalities. As a result, the resources that space-based assets provide can be assured by creating duplications of those capabilities in any of the domains.
As critical as space capabilities are to today’s warfighters, those empowering abilities are even more critical to tomorrow’s. Senior leaders’ abilities to make decisions and to direct their forces will rely largely on those on-orbit assets. In looking to future requirements, the military space community faces a dual challenge: Fulfill today’s military needs while at the same time planning for, resourcing, and developing multiple ways to provide assured space-based support to future joint and Army systems. These efforts are aimed at eliminating that possible “day without space.” ♦
Editor’s note: Brigadier General Story is deputy commander, operations, USASMDC/ARSTRAT.