Works in Progress: FY2010 Defense Budget
Written by Jason Verdugo
scheduled for delivery until early spring,
the administration’s policy positions on space
and missile defense are slowly unveiled.
A Contentious and Expensive Development
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) remains one of the most contentious and expensive technological developments in military history. This technology attempts to counter the most powerful of all weapons—the ballistic missile with a weapon of mass destruction payload (WMD).
For its part, the Obama administration has cautiously staked out early policy positions on BMD as well as military space—most prominently with these postings on the White House Website.
• National Missile Defense: The Obama-Biden administration will support missile defense but ensure that it is developed in a way that is pragmatic and cost-effective; and, most importantly, does not divert resources from other national security priorities until we are positive the technology will protect the American public.
• Ensure Freedom of Space: The Obama-Biden administration will restore American leadership on space issues, seeking a worldwide ban on weapons that interfere with military and commercial satellites. They will thoroughly assess possible threats to U.S. space assets and the best options, military and diplomatic, for countering them, establishing contingency plans to ensure that U.S. forces can maintain or duplicate access to information from space assets and accelerating programs to harden U.S. satellites against attack.
As the administration was primarily focused on domestic economic matters during its first month in office, it remains to be seen how President Obama’s initial defense pronouncements will be spelled out in the FY10 budget.
BMD Elements
BMD consists of a “system of systems,” which is a set of different types of missiles, radars and satellites that are used by different branches of the military from multiple platforms. The Army employs the Patriot family of missiles with the PAC-3 versions currently being fielded and the Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) with deliveries expected in FY09 (prime contractor: Lockheed Martin for both systems). The Army also fields the Ground Based-midcourse defense Interceptor (GBI). While GBI is “deployed,” it is the least tested of the Army interceptors and the most expensive. It’s this expense and apparent lack of capability that has put this particular system in the crosshairs of the Obama administration. GBI unfortunately is a victim of its own complexity, which contributes to its costs. As the capabilities of BMD systems increase, so does the cost to develop and deploy. The sensor and data processing requirements intensify with each increment of capability. The tests also become ever more complex and costly along with targets and range requirements. A PAC-3 can use a surplus target drone aircraft, but the GBI requires the use of a large and expensive satellite class rocket such as Minuteman, Titan or Delta. PAC-3 can be tested at White Sands Missile Range, in contrast with the GBI range requirements using the large expanse of the Pacific Ocean.
There is a directed energy airborne portion of the current BMD, the Airborne Laser (ABL), which is a chemical oxygen iodine laser (COIL) embedded into a modified Boeing 747 airframe (prime contractor: Boeing). In November 2008, the ABL team completed the successful firing and propagation test of the ABL megawatt-class weapons system through the aircraft turret during ground tests. This developmental, boost-phase element remains on schedule for its first in-flight test against a missile-type target this fall. Against these successes, ABL funding was reduced in the FY09 defense bill.
The Navy’s portion of Aegis BMD consists of the SM-3 (prime contractor: Raytheon) and SPY-1 radar (prime contractor: Lockheed Martin) fielded on CG-47 Ticonderoga-class cruisers with vertical launch systems (CG-52 forward) and DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. The AEGIS SM-3 (Block 1A) system has the distinction of being fielded to the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF). The SM-3 also has the distinction of being the only weapon portion of BMD that has been used in a real-world situation—the shooting down of a wayward satellite in February 2008. Japan participated with targeting data and communications networking.
The Obama administration will also see that most of the lower layers of BMD are deployed, operational and will continue to provide a return through FY10 as a result of foreign military sales (FMS) and other cooperative efforts.
One very successful international program that should be embraced by the Obama team is the SM-3 Cooperative Development Program, which focuses on joint development with the JMSDF of a 21-inch variant of the SM-3 missile (SM-3 Block IIA). A number of FMS agreements will continue to advance on the new administration’s watch, in particular with the United Arab Emirates. In December 2008, the United Arab Emirates signed an agreement, not to exceed $3.3 billion, for additional PAC-3 systems, which was complemented in February 2009 by an additional order for spare parts totaling $246 million. The United States is also involved in early talks with India regarding PAC-3 and AEGIS missile defense systems. India has been increasing defense purchases from around the world including the United States as a supplier, which can expand more once negotiations between the United States and India regarding “End User Monitoring” agreements are finalized.
In addition to the FY10 defense budget, the Obama administration will also have an opportunity to establish policy on future U.S. BMD cooperative efforts in the Quadrennial Defense Review due for release this August.
These systems will most likely be safe from cutbacks in the FY10 budget as they also serve as the backbone of our ground-based air defenses. PAC-3 and THAAD use ground-based radars, which are less powerful and less expensive than the radars and satellites required for GBI. These particular requirements help keep the cost of PAC-3 and THAAD considerably lower than GBI to develop and deploy.
Satellites can be some of the most expensive line items in the federal budget; however, their value in providing global scale situational awareness and communications are incalculable in U.S. military operations. Ground-based midcourse defense requires a combination of earth-based and space-based sensors to perform effectively. The initial cost to deploy the GBI is staggering and when long term use, maintenance and replacement costs are calculated, the life cycle requirements have made many politicians wonder, do we really need this? The Obama administration will certainly consider what offsets could be funded by a canceled GBI program. Do current U.S. BMD system elements suffice against North Korea and Iran? Iran was certainly listening to the Senate Armed Services Committee when on January 31, 2009, Senator Carl Levin said, “I’d love to see” cuts to the missile-defense program. Iran shocked the world four days later on February 4, 2009, when the nation successfully launched and inserted a satellite into orbit. The Russians “tipped their hats” at Iran for now having the capability to deliver a payload anywhere on the Earth. General James Cartwright, vice chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, added that this launch was “compatible with, commensurate with, an intercontinental ballistic missile type capability.” U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in a meeting with her Czech counterpart that the United States would “reconsider where we stand” in regards to placing GBI in Europe if Iran were to shift the focus of their nuclear program. However, Iran is not the only country flexing its missile muscles, reports are increasing regarding a North Korean missile test with the capability to reach as far as California.
Other reports show that if proposed U.S. missile defense assets (up to 10 silo-based, long-range interceptors in Poland and an X-band midcourse radar in the Czech Republic) are not placed in Europe, the Navy has an inadequate number of Aegis BMD-capable ships to sufficiently protect Europe. A missile launched from Iran would be well into its mid-course phase by the time the AEGIS ships could position themselves for an intercept. They could possibly take multiple shots given the deployment of the SM-2 Block 4 with terminal intercept capability; however, the best intercept of any missile is as far from its impact area as possible. This is only possible with GBIs or ABL, which are candidate programs for cutback or cancellation.
To further illustrate the staggering cost of BMD, the MDA has released the draft RFP for its Missile Defense Agency Engineering and Support Services (MiDAESS) procurement with an estimated value of at least $5 billion. Putting a price on any of the boost, midcourse, or terminal defense segments of an integrated BMD system is in fact putting a price on our cities, our citizens and our allies. One cannot only look at North Korea and Iran as threats. Analysis indicates the WMD threat is increasing globally. The large nuclear wielding nations have tried and failed for 40 years to curb nuclear weapons proliferation. Certainly Iran and North Korea were not a nuclear or ballistic threat 20 years ago. Who will be a threat 20 years from now? Defense strategy cannot just be made upon what we know, but also on what we do not know.
For diplomacy, the Obama administration has signaled a willingness to discuss joint missile defense and related issues with the Russians. In early February at the 45th Munich Security Conference, Vice President Joe Biden said the United States and Russia have a special obligation to lead the international effort to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in the world. Going beyond existing treaties to negotiate deeper cuts into both countries’ arsenals is just one suggestion. “We will not agree with Russia on everything,” Biden said. “But the United States and Russia can disagree and still work together where our interests coincide.”
However, one is puzzled at such discussions when U.S. missile assets in Europe are eyed for a bottoms-up review. How can any joint defense be accomplished with a system that may not exist? The Russians and the Europeans won’t foot the tab of a multi-billion dollar missile defense system no matter how much it would be in their best interest. These systems take decades to develop and deploy. Long-term decisions must be made; waiting for a change of administrations while a defensive system is kept on developmental life support has already resulted in years of delay for initial operational capability and has cost more money in the long run.
Editor’s Note: Jason Verdugo is a military research analyst at Vienna, Va.-based Centurion Research Solutions. He may be contacted at This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it .