Q&A: Senator Carl Levin
Written by Marty Kauchak
Leading Congressional Oversight
of Space and Missile Programs
Sen. Carl Levin
Chairman
Senate Armed Services Committee
He won election to the Detroit City Council in 1969, becoming its president in 1973 by winning the most votes citywide. In 1978, he won an upset victory over the number-two Republican in the U.S. Senate. He was re-elected in 1984, 1990, 1996, 2002 and 2008.
Q: What are your top three items of special interest and concern in the department’s space and missile systems’ portfolio during the fiscal year 2010 budget deliberations?
A: The first priority is working to improve the acquisition process. This problem is not unique to the space programs; it applies across the DoD acquisition process. That is why I have introduced with Sen. McCain S. 454, the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009. One way to address the space acquisition issues is to work with DoD to ensure that the space programs establish reasonable requirements for new programs, and that these programs have mature technology levels before contracts are awarded. It is equally important to ensure that new programs are not started unless the budget for the program is consistent with the independent cost estimates. Improving the acquisition of space systems is essential to ensure that that the U.S. maintains its space superiority, as space has become one of the important tools that the U.S. military relies on to function effectively.
For strategic missile systems, one of the long-term issues is the industrial base. The number and type of strategic missiles that might be needed in the future is one of the issues that will be addressed in the Nuclear Posture Review, which Congress mandated and which the Obama administration will complete at the end of the year.
Q: Please provide your assessment of current acquisition policies for space and ballistic missile defense systems.
A: The acquisition approach for missile defense needs to be corrected. In 2002, Missile Defense Agency [MDA] programs were exempted from normal acquisition rules and procedures, an approach that has caused problems. MDA acquisition programs have not been subject to the same oversight and management by the under secretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics as all other major defense acquisition programs. As the Government Accountability Office has noted, MDA programs have not yet had baselines established for schedule, cost or performance, which makes adequate oversight difficult. MDA operated for more than five years exclusively on RDT&E funding, even for non-RDT&E programs. Two years ago, Congress required MDA to start using normal funding categories, including procurement, operation and sustainment, and military construction funds. This is an important step, but more needs to be done to bring MDA programs into compliance with generally applicable acquisition statutes and regulations. It appears that, under General O’Reilly’s leadership, MDA programs are moving in this direction. At his nomination hearing, Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn said he believed that, with rare exception, all defense acquisition programs should be managed through normal acquisition channels, including missile defense. I fully agree.
With respect to space systems, the acquisition problems stem from three primary issues: unreasonable requirements, aggressive schedules and funding, and immature technologies. But there are other reasons as well. The DoD Cost Analysis Improvement Group [CAIG] has recently looked at the space industrial base, which has experienced considerable consolidation in the last 10 years, and has arrived at some interesting conclusions about budget growth and schedule delays in space acquisition programs. One of the findings is that the ability to do systems integration has substantially eroded largely as a result of too few programs. Integrating all the parts of a satellite is quite challenging and one of the areas where many satellite programs run into trouble. The CAIG found for instance, that when space programs were less expensive and took less time to design, build and launch, people would work on many programs from start to finish throughout their careers. With fewer, more expensive space programs, the experience level has gone down.
In addition to the shortage of engineers in the industrial base, there is also a shortage of experienced technical staff at the Department of Defense and in the military services. One of the provisions of S.454 [section 101] would require the Department of Defense to rebuild its systems engineering capabilities, to help ensure that we have capabilities needed for all major defense acquisition programs, including space programs.
Q: How adequate is the current U.S. boost phase missile defense concept?
A: The current boost-phase intercept technology development programs [airborne laser and the kinetic energy interceptor] have limitations that raise doubts about whether they would be operationally effective, suitable, survivable, cost-effective or affordable. Because of these concerns, last year Congress enacted a requirement for the National Academy of Sciences [NAS] to conduct an independent assessment of whether boost-phase missile defense is technically feasible and practical. The NAS report should help us consider how to proceed with both the concept and the technology for boost phase missile defense in the future.
Q: Please share your perspectives on the future of U.S. cooperative missile defense activities with Israel, Japan and European nations.
A: The U.S. currently has robust and productive missile defense cooperation with Israel and also with Japan. Our cooperation with Israel benefits both nations by developing and producing capabilities that protect Israel from missile attacks, and that are complementary to, and interoperable with, U.S. missile defense systems in the region. We continue to pursue a number of programs of mutual interest for defenses against short-range and mediumrange threats, and recently deployed an AN/TPY-2 radar to Israel to enhance missile defense capabilities in the region.
Our cooperation with Japan is focused on developing and producing the next generation of sea-based missile defense interceptor, the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3), Block IIA, that will be used by the Aegis weapon system aboard U.S. and Japanese ships, and maybe on land as well. Japan is making a significant investment and contributing its technological expertise to this effort, which is intended to produce an important component of our defensive capabilities. Japan is also procuring the current version of the SM-3 interceptor from the United States.
Missile defense cooperation with Europe is on two tracks. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] is working with MDA on an interoperable missile defense command and control system for the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense [ALTBMD] program designed to protect forward-deployed NATO forces. The trilateral effort by the United States, Germany and Italy to develop and produce the Medium Extended Air Defense System [MEADS] is intended to produce such a forward-deployable system starting sometime after 2015. However, NATO has not yet made a decision on whether to deploy missile defenses to protect its population or territory. Consequently, other NATO nations have not yet produced significant levels of interceptors that could work with the ALTBMD command and control system.
On the other track, it is not yet clear what will happen with the proposed deployment of a long-range missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. The Obama administration is reviewing this option, among others, and it has made clear that any deployed missile defense systems would have to be operationally effective, pragmatic and cost-effective. Congress has enacted a number of important conditions on using funds for procurement, construction and deployment of that proposed system, including the requirement that the host nation parliaments must first ratify any agreements on deployment. Also, before funds can be used to acquire or deploy the operational interceptor, the secretary of defense would have to certify, after receiving the views of the director of operational test and evaluation, that the interceptor has demonstrated, through successful, operationally realistic flight testing, a high probability of working in an operationally effective manner and the ability to accomplish its mission. Given that the proposed two-stage interceptor has not completed development, let alone begun testing, it will likely be several years before any determination of operational effectiveness can be made. There are other systems, like Aegis BMD and THAAD, that need to be considered for potential defense of Europe, and there are other forms of missile defense cooperation that are important to pursue.
One additional area of cooperation I think we need to pursue energetically is the possibility of cooperating with Russia on missile defense capabilities to provide protection against Iran’s ballistic missile systems. A nuclear-armed Iran with ballistic missiles would be a threat to which Russia cannot be, and I believe is not, indifferent. Mikhail Gorbachev—the former Soviet leader—recently told a number of senators that a nuclear-armed Iran would be even more of a threat to Russia than to the United States.
U.S.-Russian cooperation on missile defense against Iranian missiles—even if we were simply to begin serious discussions on the subject—would send a powerful signal to Iran. Iran would face, in a dramatic way, a growing unity against her pursuit of dangerous nuclear technology. U.S.-Russian cooperation on missile defense, in other words, could change the geopolitical dynamic in the region and reduce the emerging strength of Iran—which is a state supporter of terrorism and a threat to much of the Middle East, including the Arab world.
Given the disagreement between the United States and Russia over the proposed deployment of U.S. missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic, it might seem that there is no realistic chance for missile defense cooperation. However, this is a case where the security of each nation would be enhanced if we could find a cooperative path to address Iran’s missile capabilities. Since we have a mutual security interest in addressing a shared security challenge, surely it is worth the effort to try. Secretary Gates has told the Armed Services Committee that NATO would welcome that effort.
In previous bilateral discussions, the Russians offered to share early warning data from the Gabala radar in Azerbaijan. That radar information would be useful to the United States, as a supplement to our existing radar capabilities for all ranges of missile defense. Also, the United States and Russia previously agreed on a Joint Data Exchange Center in Moscow, but the effort to establish such a center got bogged down in differences over tax and liability issues. We should resume serious talks to resolve these differences.
Leaders in both the U.S. and Russia have recently expressed interest in exploring missile defense cooperation. The bottom line is simple: We have a new opportunity to seek a cooperative approach with Russia on missile defense, and we should seize it. The upside potential of such an effort is huge—a geopolitical game changer. The downside is minimal.
Q: Are there sufficient levels of realism and rigor in current Missile Defense Agency flight test events?
A: With some systems, especially the Aegis BMD system, the testing has been quite rigorous and successful. It has been more operationally realistic than other MDA programs, and has included salvo testing and multiple target engagements. The operational test community assesses that the currently deployed version of the Aegis BMD system is both operationally effective and suitable, which has been demonstrated through testing. New variants of the standard missile interceptor and upgraded versions of the Aegis software will require additional, rigorous and realistic testing.
With the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense [THAAD] program, MDA removed three previously planned flight tests, which has added unwarranted risk to the program. But THAAD has done well in tests where the target has worked, including a recent successful salvo test where two THAAD interceptors were fired at a single target. That is how the system would work in a real engagement. The system needs more testing, but so far has shown real promise, and DOT&E reports that it is expected to provide an important capability. There is also a need for testing the interoperability between Aegis BMD and THAAD.
The really big testing shortfall is in the Ground-based Midcourse Defense [GMD] system. The director of operational test and evaluation [DOT&E] wrote in December 2008 that “GMD flight testing to date will not support a high level of confidence in its limited capabilities.” That is for a system that has been deployed for more than four years! In fiscal year 2008, MDA did not even conduct a single intercept flight test of GMD, although it planned and budgeted for two intercept tests each fiscal year. That is not acceptable. The limited GMD flight tests so far have not been adequate to verify and validate the models that are needed to accurately predict GMD performance. And DOT&E has indicated that the GMD tests have not been realistic in a number of respects, such as “salvo defense” [multiple interceptors against a single target] or in “multiple simultaneous engagement” [multiple interceptors against multiple targets]. Nor has the system conducted an intercept test using the Cobra Dane radar, which is the primary sensor for the system. These conditions and numerous others would have to be satisfied before GMD testing could be considered sufficiently operationally realistic, and before we would know whether the system will be operationally effective, suitable and survivable. Much work remains to be done, and it will likely take years.
Q: To what levels will Congress be able to fund the department’s requests for space and missile defense programs as contained in the president’s fiscal year 2010 funding request?
A: Without having the budget request or a clear budget picture for fiscal year 2010, it is not possible to provide a specific answer. Congress will, as it does every year, provide the funds it believes are necessary to provide for our security, including for space and missile defense programs.
Q: Your assessment please on the health of the U.S. space and missile systems’ industry and work force?
A: As I have mentioned, the DoD CAIG study has highlighted some troubling issues in the space industrial base. On the strategic missiles, the land-based Minuteman III ICBM is in the final years of a multi-phased, multi-year life extension program. The Trident D-5 SLBM program will continue to buy D-5 missiles for several more years. When both these programs are completed, there are no new missile programs planned. Both the Navy and the Air Force are looking at ways to sustain an industrial base to be able to maintain these missiles through the missiles’ lifetimes. Whether the country needs a new strategic missile is one of the issues that, as I mentioned, will need to be discussed and debated in the Nuclear Posture Review. ♦