Leadership Insight: General James E. Cartright

Written by General James E. Cartwright

The reality is what we’re putting together today as an architecture has to have the flexibility to address the unknown. Got it. I want to be able to go after a certain [threat]—you know, in midcourse, and I want to be able to intercept with complex decisions being made by the system. I also want to be able to turn and work the terminal, and I want to work the boost. But the reality is we don’t know how these things are going to be put together. And anything you’re building today for 2015 or 2020 is laughable if you think you know—we know what the reality of those times is going to be.

And so a system that in 30 days can completely morph itself into the threat is really what we’re trying to buy. What we have here and the leverage that we have for this system is pretty significant because of the people that have put it together, because of the way that we have done it, because we have been able to go cross-domain, so to speak, rather than in the standard stovepipes to put together an architecture that really can have the opportunity to technically stay ahead of the threat, technically address and operationally address the things that really emerge, not the things that we wish would have emerged. That’s critical.

So whether it’s a tumbling satellite or whether it is something completely different, my sense and where we want to be is to start moving in a direction that allows us to look across and be able to adapt and build a system that has the opportunity to stay ahead of the threat. It’s always about staying ahead of the threat. Whether it is in business or anything else, competitive edge at the end of the day is where you want to be. And don’t ever believe that competitive edge is permanent, because it just plain isn’t.

So when, at least from my perspective, we look at missile defense and some of the hard decisions that we’re going to have to make as we start to go forward in ‘10, ‘11, ‘12, these budgets that are in front of us, and the decisions we have to make, the things we’re going to hope to procure in the defense department are the things that are not niche, that have the opportunity to address the unknown, that have the opportunity to stay ahead of the threat, protect this nation, impose significant cost on the adversary, in comparison to what it is we’re paying for the capability, and can always stay inside of the threat’s decision cycle, because the perfect solutions after the fact don’t do us much good.

And we’re really good at that.

It’s a question of balance. But the reality is most likely over here in deployed forces, allies and friends. And the work that is being done this year, the work that is going to be done, in the next couple of years, the work that has been done, and the architecture associated with those terminal-defense-type capabilities—those area-defense-type capabilities that will have the mobility and have the capability to be out there, to address those threats, are where we’re going to start to put money, because it is the most likely.

But also when you look at this architecture, when you think about the weapon, the sensors, the command and control, it’s been all about the weapon. The reality is the flexibility for the unknown lies in the sensors in the command and control.

So if you’re going to do something, over the next couple of years, to address the unknown, then my dollar is going to go toward sensor and command and control. OK, we’ll build out. But it’s in that sensor net.

The leverage is in that sensor net. And the leverage is in the command and control of that sensor net, because you can solve more problems having nothing to do with missile defense, for the range of threats that this nation will face, over the next 20 years, in that command and control and sensor net. ♦

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